C1 Identity & least privilege
0.33 / 1.00
Codex runs as you and does not narrow your authority for the commands it runs: by default every shell command gets your full environment, including API keys, cloud credentials and GitHub tokens, because the built-in KEY/SECRET/TOKEN filter is switched off by default. MCP servers are the exception and receive only a small core set of variables. What keeps those credentials from being used is not identity scoping but the sandbox: network is off, so using a stolen token needs a command you approve. An experimental, opt-in credential broker can swap GitHub and OpenAI tokens for dummies, but it is off by default.
C2 Approval gates
0.53 / 1.00
Approval in Codex is built around the sandbox: commands that stay inside it (writing project files, running tests) run without asking, while anything that needs to escape it - network access, writes outside the project, or a command the model marks as needing escalation - stops for your approval with the exact command on screen. Forced `rm -f` style deletions always prompt, and MCP tools prompt unless the server itself declares them read-only. Allow-rules you add are saved in your home directory, not the repo, but a repository you have trusted can ship a .codex/config.toml that turns approvals off. There is no undo: escalated commands run fully outside the sandbox once approved.
C3 Tool & action scoping
0.30 / 1.00
The main tool is a general shell that accepts any command string, so argument validation is minimal: there is no allowlist, only a small heuristic that flags forced `rm` and user-written prefix rules. The file-edit tool checks every path against the writable roots before auto-approving. Everything is on by default, though the shell tool can be disabled. In practice the reach of a misused command is bounded by the sandbox: writes stay in the project, but reads cover the whole machine.
C4 Code-execution isolation
0.55 / 1.00
Model-issued commands run inside a real operating-system sandbox: a deny-by-default Seatbelt profile on macOS and bubblewrap plus seccomp with no network namespace on Linux, failing closed if bubblewrap is missing rather than running on the host. Writes are limited to the project (with .git and .codex kept read-only) and /tmp, and network is off. Leaving the sandbox requires a per-command human approval, but approved allow-rules and trusted project config can switch it off, and MCP servers run on the host. Inside the sandbox, though, commands see your full environment (credentials included) and can read your entire disk.
C5 Untrusted input blast radius
0.50 / 1.00
Codex does not try to detect prompt injection; its protection is structural. Because the default sandbox has no network and blocks writes outside the project, an agent hijacked by a malicious README, command output or search result cannot send data out or change things beyond the project without you approving a specific command. It can still read your secrets into the conversation and rewrite or delete project files unattended. MCP or app tools that their server labels read-only are called without approval and could become an outbound channel when configured.
C6 Memory, context & configuration integrity
0.50 / 1.00
Codex is careful with settings a repository could plant: project config, exec-policy rules and hooks only load after you explicitly trust the folder, and each hook must additionally be trusted by its content hash, stored in your own config so a changed hook stops running. Some keys (model endpoints, notify, telemetry) are always ignored in project config. But once a folder is trusted its config can still change approvals, sandbox mode and MCP servers, AGENTS.md instructions load silently, and because AGENTS.md is not write-protected inside the sandbox the agent can edit it and influence future sessions. Long-term memories are off by default.
C7 Third-party extensions
0.35 / 1.00
No third-party extensions run by default. MCP servers and plugins are added by you or by a trusted project's config, launched as separate processes with a cleaned-up environment but without a sandbox, and there is no version pinning or integrity check for MCP commands or custom marketplaces. OpenAI's curated plugin catalog is synced from its own repository. When a skill needs an MCP server Codex asks before installing it, but the prompt lists only server names, not the command that will run.
C8 Secrets & sensitive-data protection
0.28 / 1.00
Your ChatGPT/OpenAI login is stored in a plaintext auth.json with owner-only permissions by default (MCP OAuth tokens prefer the OS keyring). Secret redaction exists but is applied only to some displayed command text and to memories, not to tool output sent to the model or to saved transcripts. The biggest gap is that every shell command inherits your full environment, so long-lived keys are within reach of any command the model runs. Usage analytics are on by default; prompt logging to OpenTelemetry is off.
C9 Audit & traceability
0.55 / 1.00
Every session is written to a JSON-lines transcript under ~/.codex/sessions that records each tool call and its output with timestamps, including MCP calls; sub-agents get their own transcripts. The file sits outside the sandbox's writable area, so the model's commands cannot edit it. Approval prompts and your decisions are not persisted, there is no tamper-evidence, and write failures are only logged while the agent carries on.
C10 Limits & kill switch
0.33 / 1.00
Codex has no cap on turns, wall-clock time or spend by default; the token-budget feature is still under development and off. You can interrupt a turn at any time, which cancels the running task, but long-running commands started as background terminals keep running until you clean them up or exit. Sub-agents inherit the same settings and are capped at 6 concurrent threads and a depth of 1, and at most 64 background processes can exist.
SafetyCard